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Legal Regulations Relating to the Passive and
Active Legal Capacity of Persons with
Intellectual and Psychosocial Disabilities in
Light of the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities and the Impending
Reform of the Hungarian Civil Code
ISTVÁN HOFFMAN* & GYÖRGY KÖNCZEI**
I. INTRODUCTION
In order to examine the application of the principle of equality
before the law, we must first define the group of people who we regard
as persons with disabilities for the purposes of this study. The term
“mental” was once used to refer to people with intellectual or
psychiatric disabilities.1 The approach used in this study is the one
introduced and adopted in the course of the travaux préparatoires of
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD or

* István Hoffman is a Ph.D. in Administrative Law. He is now a Lecturer of the Department of
Administrative Law at Faculty of Law and Political Sciences of Eötvös Loránd University,
Budapest (Hungary) and Associate Professor of the College for Modern Business Studies,
Tatabánya (Hungary). He is doing research on Administrative Law (especially on the
management of public services) and social law (especially law of equal opportunities and
disability law).
** György Könczei dr. habil., D.Sc., Ph.D. is a Professor of Disability Studies and former Dean
of the Bárczi Gusztáv Faculty of Special Education of Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest
(Hungary). He is the Chair of the Governmental Committee for the European Social Charter,
Council of Europe, Strasbourg and member of the Committee on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities under Article 34 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. He is
doing research in Disability Studies (especially the fundamental rights of the persons with
disabilities).
1. Cf. Kevin K. Walsh, Thoughts on Changing the Term Mental Retardation, in 40
MENTAL RETARDATION 70, 71–72 (2002) (discussing the changes in terminology referring to
disabled people).
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A. Defining Persons with Intellectual Disabilities
1. The Traditional Civil Law Approach Under the Civil Law System
Traditional civil law, based on Roman law, approaches the issue
primarily from the perspective of a person’s active legal capacity.4 As
we shall demonstrate below, under traditional civil law, the active legal
capacity of a person who lacks the mental or cognitive ability to
conduct his own affairs is restricted or denied.
As medical knowledge was limited, this approach was initially
based on an assessment of a person’s actual participation in society.5
That is to say, if a person’s conduct failed to comply with certain
religious and moral customs and norms, he or she was regarded as
lacking active legal capacity (a capacity to act). Indeed, in many
instances, the person’s passive legal capacity (a capacity for rights) was
also denied.6
Nineteenth century developments in medicine (particularly in the
fields of neurology and psychiatry), however, established the preeminence of the medical approach (or social approach) to disability by
the beginning of the twentieth century.7 Under this approach, any person
with limited cognitive abilities or a diagnosable neurological or
psychiatric condition was defined as a person with disabilities.
Intellectual disability and the issue of active legal capacity were viewed
as both medical and legal matters.8
2. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006) [hereinafter CRPD].
3. See id. arts. 1, 16, ¶ 2.
4. See Benjamin Brake & Peter J. Katzenstein, The Transnational Spread of American
Law: Legalization as Soft Power, INST. FOR INT’L L. AND JUST., 14 (June 2010), http://www.iilj.
org/courses/documents/HC2010Oct22.Katzenstein.pdf; RHONA K.M. SMITH, TEXTBOOK ON
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 185–86 (3d ed. 2007).
5. See Paul Varul et al., Restrictions on Active Legal Capacity, 9 JURIDICA INT’L 99, 100
(2004), available at http://www.juridicainternational.eu/public/pdf/ji_2004_1_99.pdf.
6. See id. at 100; Xinyan Ma & Gouqiang Li, On Adult Deficiency of Capacity for Conduct
and Perfection of Adult Guardianship System: With Consideration to System Arrangement of
Civil Code, 2 U.S.–CHINA L. REV. 27, 30–31 (2005).
7. Julie Mulvany, Disability, Impairment or Illness? The Relevance of the Social Model of
Disability to the Study of Mental Disorder, in RETHINKING OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF MENTAL
HEALTH 40–41 (Joan Busfield ed., 2001).
8. See SZLADITS KÁROLY, A MAGYAR MAGÁNJOG VÁZLATA [AN OUTLINE OF
HUNGARIAN CIVIL LAW] 80–81, 137 (1937) (discussing the medical approach in a major work on
Hungarian civil law).
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However, because it could not address certain life circumstances,
the medical approach was never fully implemented. Moreover, the
effects of particular medical conditions on the cognitive abilities of
various individuals were not uniform.9 The civil law system sought to
address these circumstances by means of a general provision,
effectively giving judges a free hand. In our opinion the general
provision tended to use the following formula: “the lack of cognitive
abilities for other reasons.”
2. The Human Rights Approach to Disability
In the second half of the twentieth century, the international
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms was enhanced,
partly in response to the abuses that had taken place under dictatorial
regimes in the 1930s and 1940s.10 Similarly, national constitutions and
basic laws gave increased attention to developing proper safeguards for
human rights.11
The development of human rights became manifest above all in
legal provisions ensuring equality before the law as well as equal
opportunities.12 Other provisions sought to promote the dignity of every
human person.13
As a result of such legal developments, the safeguarding of the
rights of persons with disabilities became a priority as a human right.
This, in turn, required a complete reappraisal of the notion of
disability.14
International human rights norms (such as the CRPD) as well as
recent national legal norms (such as Germany’s Law on the Equality of
People with Disabilities (LEPD))15 have adopted a complex definition of
9. See Mulvany, supra note 7, at 39–40.
10. See DAVID MORRISON, REALIZING HUMAN RIGHTS 39–40 (1996), available at
http://www.strathmor.com/assets/pdf/realizing%20human%20rights%20-%20final.pdf. For an
example of the so-called “euthanasia” program in Nazi Germany, see Michael Burleigh, The
Legacy of Nazi Medicine in Context, in MEDICINE AND MEDICAL ETHICS IN NAZI GERMANY 112,
113–14 (Francis R. Nicosia & Jonathan Huener eds., 2002).
11. CURTIS F.J. DOEBBLER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 8–11 (2004).
12. See Raymond Lang, The United Nations Convention on the Right and Dignities for
Persons with Disability: A Panacea For Ending Disability Discrimination?, 3 EUR. J.
DISABILITY RES. 266, 268 (2009).
13. See SMITH, supra note 4, at 185–86.
14. Ann Macfarlane, Aspects of Intervention: Consultation, Care, Help and Support, in
BEYOND DISABILITY: TOWARDS AN ENABLING SOCIETY 6, 6–8 (Gerald Hales ed., 1996).
15. Behindertengleichstellungsgesetz [BGG] [Law on Equal Opportunities for Disabled
People], Apr. 27, 2002, BGBL. I at 1467, last amended by Gesetz [G], Dec. 19, 2007, BGBL. I at
3024, art. 12 (Ger.), available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/bgg/gesamt.pdf.
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disability,16 incorporating medical and social factors.17 In this holistic
definition, intellectual, cognitive, or sensory impairment is just one
consideration; each alone is not a sufficient condition. 18 The definition
requires the presence of a long-term impairment hindering the
individual’s full and effective participation in society.19
This complex definition, incorporating social elements, has been
applied in various national and international documents in the early
twenty-first century.20 Since this notion of disability is capable of
expressing the factual nature of disability, that a biological impairment
fundamentally limits a person’s social involvement, for the purposes of
this paper, disability will be understood in accordance with the above
complex, or holistic, definition.21
B. The Legal Status of Disability in the Various Fields of Law
Concerning the legal status of disability, we shall principally
examine provisions in the various fields of law relating to passive legal
capacity (a capacity for rights) and active legal capacity (a capacity to
act).
The sedes materiae of these provisions are to be found in civil
law,22 but in the practice and safeguarding of fundamental rights, legal
provisions relating to constitutional rights are also salient. For instance,
16. See ANDREAS DIMOPOULOS, ISSUES IN HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTION OF
INTELLECTUALLY DISABLED PERSONS 71 (2010).
17. Thus the CRPD—ratified by Hungary in Act XCII of 2007—contains the following
definition: “Persons with disabilities include those who have long-term physical, mental,
intellectual or sensory impairments which in interaction with various barriers may hinder their
full and effective participation in society on an equal basis with others.” CRPD, supra note 2,
art. 1, ¶ 2; Hungary: Parliament Reforms Legal Capacity Laws, MENTAL DISABILITY
ADVOCACY CTR. (Sept. 22, 2009), http://mdac.info/hungary-parliament-reforms-legal-capacitylaws.
18. See JAVAID REHMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 611–12 (2d ed. 2010); see
also Melinda Jones & Lee Ann Basser Marks, Law and the Social Construction of Disability, in
DISABILITY, DIVERS-ABILITY, AND LEGAL CHANGE 1, 4–6 (Melinda Jones & Lee Ann Basser
Marks eds., 1999).
19. CRPD, supra note 2, art. 1.
20. See Varul et al., supra note 5, at 101. But see Penny Letts, The Protection of People
Without Mental Capacity, in ELDER ABUSE WORK: BEST PRACTICE IN BRITAIN AND CANADA
252, 252–53 (Jacki Pritchard ed., 1999) (emphasizing that United Kingdom legislation adopted in
the 1980s and 1990s applies the medical approach in the field of intellectual disabilities).
21. See Peter Mittler, Meeting the Needs of People with an Intellectual Disability:
International Perspectives, in THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITIES: DIFFERENT BUT EQUAL 25, 28 (Stanley S. Herr et al. eds., 2003).
22. See JOHN PARRY & ERIC Y. DROGIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW, EVIDENCE AND
TESTIMONY: A COMPREHENSIVE REFERENCE MANUAL FOR LAWYERS, JUDGES AND MENTAL
DISABILITY PROFESSIONALS 7–9 (2007).
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if a person has restricted electoral rights (a restriction or deprivation of
active and/or passive voting rights) owing to her disabilities, this will
also reduce his or her effective participation in society, since he or she
cannot take part in the making of decisions that affect the community or
can do so only in a limited manner.
Through the aforementioned basic institutions, we can review the
relationship of the legal system to the life situations of people with
disabilities. In order to give a clear answer to this question, however, we
must first define the meaning of the terms passive legal capacity (a
capacity for rights) and active legal capacity (a capacity to act).
C. Passive Legal Capacity (a Capacity for Rights) and Active Legal
Capacity (a Capacity to Act)
1. Passive and Active Legal Capacity in Civil Law Systems
In countries with civil law systems, a sharp distinction is made between passive and active legal capacity.23 This distinction goes beyond
the difference found in classical Roman law between the capacity to sue
and the capacity to be sued.24 Based on the dogmatic results of Roman
jurisprudence, in civil law systems passive legal capacity means the capacity of a person to have rights and duties, while active legal capacity
means that a person can cause rights and duties to arise through his actions with regard to both himself and others.25
In contemporary substantive civil law, a sharp distinction is made
between passive and active legal capacity. The two terms are interde23. These countries include the countries of the European Continent, Middle and South
America (Latin America), the former member states of the USSR, Québec (Canada) and
Louisiana (USA). Scotland and South Africa have a mixed (civil law and common law) legal
system. See HAMZA GÁBOR, AZ EURÓPAI MAGÁNJOG FEJLŐDÉSE: A MODERN MAGÁNJOGI
RENDSZEREK KIALAKULÁSA A RÓMAI JOGI HAGYOMÁNYOK ALAPJÁN [THE DEVELOPMENT OF
EUROPEAN CIVIL LAW: THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN SYSTEMS OF CIVIL LAW BASED ON
THE TRADITIONS OF ROMAN LAW] 21–23 (2002) [hereinafter THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN
CIVIL LAW]; GÁBOR HAMZA, DIE ENTWICKLUNG DES PRIVATRECHTS AUF
RÖMISCHRECHTLICHER GRUNDLAGE:
UNTER BESONDERER BERÜCKSICHTIGUNG DER
RECHTSENTWICKLUNG IN DEUTSCHLAND, ÖSTERREICH, DER SCHWEIZ UND UNGARN [THE
DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL LAW FROM ROMAN LEGAL TRADITIONS: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS IN GERMANY, AUSTRIA, SWITZERLAND, AND HUNGARY] 9–10 (2002)
[hereinafter THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL LAW FROM ROMAN LEGAL TRADITIONS].
24. FÖLDI ANDRÁS & HAMZA GÁBOR, A RÓMAI JOG TÖRTÉNETE ÉS INSTITÚCIÓI [THE
HISTORY AND INSTITUTIONS OF ROMAN LAW] 228–29 (2001). Similar to traditional common
law, Classical Roman law did not recognize the abstract notion of subjective (civil) rights. It
treated rights basically as rights of litigation. Id.
25. Id. at 203, 225. Based on Roman law recognizing slavery, this could also mean that
passive and active legal capacity diverged—a competent person could be without active legal
capacity, and an incompetent slave could have active legal capacity. Id.
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pendent, even though since the abolition of the institution of slavery in
advanced countries in the mid-nineteenth century, almost everyone has
had passive legal capacity. By the mid-twentieth century, this principle
had become a universal one, at least at the legal level. Indeed, a ban on
slavery is contained in the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,26 adopted under the auspices of the United Nations. Concerning
active legal capacity, contemporary private substantive law has preserved the Roman law foundations; thus, a person has active legal capacity where she can, through her own actions, obtain rights for herself
or for someone else, or assume obligations.27
The situation differs slightly in the field of procedural law, where
no such sharp distinction is made between passive and active legal
capacity.28 Thus, similar to codes of procedure in other countries, the
Hungarian Code of Civil Procedure (Act III of 1952 on the Code of
Civil Procedure) recognizes a person’s capacity to sue and be sued,
which effectively embodies both passive legal capacity and active legal
capacity.29 The capacity to sue and be sued can be broken down into two
elements: first, a capacity for rights in a court of law, which is due to
almost all natural persons as well as legal persons and, on occasion,
even to entities without legal personality or legal subjectivity (e.g., the
county social and guardianship offices in the context of administrative
lawsuits);30 second, the capacity to act in a court of law, which is
broader in scope than the civil law capacity to act (e.g., in guardianship
suits, a person with limited capacity to act has full capacity to sue).31
In the field of constitutional law, we may highlight electoral law.
Based on active and passive electoral rights, individuals can take part in
the making of decisions that affect the community. Historically, a sharp
distinction has been made between electoral rights and active legal

26. REHMAN, supra note 18, at 85.
27. For more on the definition of active legal capacity, see BARNABÁS LENKOVICS &
LÁSZLÓ SZÉKELY, A SZEMÉLYI JOG VÁZLATA [THE OUTLINE OF PERSONAL RIGHTS] 31 (2000)
(Hung.); FÁBIÁN FERENC & SÁGHY MÁRIA, POLGÁRI JOG I. [HUNGARIAN CIVIL LAW, VOL. I],
20–22 (2007); J.M. Thomson, Private Law Aspects of Parents’ and Children’s Rights in Scotland,
in 1 FRONTIERS OF LIABILITY 191, 197 (P.B.H. Birks ed., 1994).
28. MIKLÓS KENGYEL, MAGYAR POLGÁRI ELJÁRÁSJOG [HUNGARIAN CIVIL PROCEDURE
LAW] 133–34 (2001).
29. Id.
30. See 1 LÁSZLÓ TÖLG-MOLNÁR, POLGÁRI ELJÁRÁSJOG [CIVIL PROCEDURE LAW] 87–88
(2006) (Hung.); A POLGÁRI PERRENDTARTÁS MAGYARÁZATA I–II. [AN EXPLANATION OF THE
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, VOL. I–II] 247–48 (János Németh ed., 1999) (Hung.).
31. AN EXPLANATION OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 30, at 243, 255–56,
1290.
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capacity in civil law.32 By the twentieth century, however, with the
spread of universal suffrage in Europe, the two became
interconnected—electoral rights were linked with a person’s full active
legal capacity in civil law.33 Modern constitutional law sometimes
exceeds this, particularly with regard to the rights of children and young
people. Indeed, in some countries, such as Austria, active voting rights
have been granted to young people who have not reached the age of full
legal capacity in civil law.34
In penal law, a sharp distinction is made between passive and
active legal capacity as well. Only a person with a capacity for guilt can
be held responsible for criminal acts.35 An age limit is also applied in
the case of capacity for guilt, but this age limit is lower than the age
limit for active legal capacity in civil law.36 Furthermore, persons with
intellectual disabilities are usually granted exemptions.37 Here, we
should also emphasize that in penal law, the medical model (a person’s
pathological mental state) is still applied when defining or assessing
intellectual disability.38
2. Passive and Active Legal Capacity in Common Law Systems
In the private law of common law systems, which resembles in
many respects the logic of classical Roman law,39 no sharp distinction is
made between passive legal capacity (a capacity for rights) and active
legal capacity (a capacity to act).40 Indeed, in common law systems, it is
only under the influence of civil law systems—and, above all, statute
law—that the abstract notion of “subjective right” (or “civil right”) has
32. See BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR A POSTCOLD WAR WORLD 15 (1993).
33. See, e.g., COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AND VOTING PROCEDURES AT
LOCAL LEVEL 41 (1999).
34. Austria First to Lower Voting Age to 16, USA TODAY (Sept. 25, 2008),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-09-25-austria-voting-age_N.htm. In federal and most
member states’ (Länder) elections in Austria, young people aged over 16 have voting rights.
Similar to the federal regulation, various provinces have also reduced the age limit for active
voting rights in provincial parliamentary elections. The age limit for passive voting rights has not
been reduced. Pat Maadi, Parliament Approves New Laws, WIENER ZEITUNG (June 5, 2007),
available at http://www.eduhi.at/dl/2007-06-05_Wiener_Zeitung._Parliament_approves_new_
laws.doc.
35. Kristina Karsay, Criminal Responsibility of Minors in National and International Legal
Order, 75 INT’L REV. PENAL L. 379, 379 (2004).
36. See id.
37. See id. at 381.
38. JOHN DELANEY, LEARNING CRIMINAL LAW AS ADVOCACY ARGUMENT 30 (2004).
39. Brake & Katzenstein, supra note 4, at 14.
40. See SMITH, supra note 4, at 251 (discussing both active and passive legal capacity, but
failing to distinguish between the two).
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arisen.41 In common law systems, legal precedents establish principles
and rules, meaning that rights are inevitably linked to their
enforceability before a court of law.42 It is the ability to take a stand
before a court of law, an ability that incorporates both passive and
active legal capacity, that has traditionally been referred to in English
legal speech as legal capacity.43 This term most closely resembles the
capacity to sue and be sued of procedural law in civil law systems.
In the fields of penal law and constitutional law, the above
conclusions are still applicable despite the differences between the
common law system and the civil law system.
II. A SURVEY OF THE PRINCIPAL HISTORICAL MODELS RELATING TO THE
PASSIVE AND ACTIVE LEGAL CAPACITY OF PERSONS WITH INTELLECTUAL
DISABILITIES
A. Legal Provisions Relating to the Passive and Active Legal Capacity
of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities—From Roman Law to the
Legal Situation Prevailing in the Mid-Twentieth Century
1. The Pre-Modern Era and Traditional Legal Systems
In the pre-modern classical and medieval eras, the legal status of
people with disabilities was poor. Disability always implied a
restriction of a person’s active legal capacity.44
According to the law of ancient Rome, a person was deprived of
active legal capacity not only by a mental disorder or illness, but also
other physical disabilities, such as blindness and especially muteness.45
In late, post-classical Roman law, however, the beginnings of an
attempt to understand disability may be observed. For instance, if a
person with a mental disorder or illness was capable of making rational
decisions in his “lighter moments” (lucidum intervallum), then that
person was to be regarded as having full active legal capacity under the
decrees of Emperor Diocletian and Emperor Justinian.46 Thus, under

41. See James H. Hutson, The Emergence of the Modern Concept of a Right in America:
The Contribution of Michael Villey, 39 AM. J. JURIS. 185, 196–97, 205–06 (1994).
42. See, e.g., Harry N. Wyatt, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L.
REV. 877, 883, 887–88, 892–95, 897–98 (1996) (discussing enforceability of inheritance rights).
43. PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 22, at 7.
44. However, Hungarian feudal (medieval) law presumed (mental) sanity. See BELIZNAY
KINGA ET AL., MAGYAR JOGTÖRTÉNET [HISTORY OF HUNGARIAN LAW] 80 (Mezey Marna ed.,
1996).
45. Id.
46. FÖLDI & HAMZA, supra note 24, at 228–29.
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these decrees, a person was only defined as disabled if he or she was
incapable of effective participation in society.47
Even so, disability could have had grave consequences in premodern law and continues to have grave consequences in the traditional
legal systems of our own era.48 For instance, during the medieval period,
people with intellectual or physical disabilities were often viewed as
witches or as being possessed by the devil. 49 In such cases, they were
deprived of passive legal capacity and sometimes even murdered.50
In certain traditional legal systems, people with disabilities are
deprived of their active legal capacity, and occasionally, their passive
legal capacity.51 Since traditional legal systems continue to exist in
developing countries, Article 12(2) of the CRPD underlines the need to
recognize the legal capacity of persons with disabilities everywhere. 52
By way of summary, we can state that the legal systems of the premodern era almost universally restricted the active legal capacity of
people with disabilities; further, in some instances, these systems even
deprived them of passive legal capacity.
2. Modern Legal Systems Until the Twentieth Century
With the development of modern legal systems, generally
recognition is now given to the fact that legal capacity is due to every
person, irrespective of disability. In modern private law, reflecting the
dogmatism of Roman jurisprudence, a clear distinction is made between
passive and active legal capacity.53
Under the civil law codes, restricting a person’s active legal
capacity was possible on three grounds: the person’s age, an inability to
express her will (e.g., intoxication), and mental illness or (congenital)
mental disability.54
Section 489 of the French Code Civil of 1804, the first great code
of civil law, recognized incompetence based on person’s age, an
inability to express her will (“imbécillité”), and incompetence arising
47. Id.
48. See BELIZNAY KINGA ET AL., supra note 44, at 73, 80.
49. Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 315,
325 (1997).
50. Id.
51. For example, in the People’s Republic of China, there is a family-based guardianship
system. See Yang Shao et al., Current Legislation on Admission on of Mentally Ill Patients in
China, 33 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 52, 56 (2010).
52. CRPD, supra note 2, art. 12, ¶ 2.
53. See Thomson, supra note 27, at 196.
54. For the various grounds, see LENKOVICS & SZÉKELY, supra note 27, at 23–25.
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from mental illness.55 Under Section 489 of the Code Civil, adults
lacking capacity were placed under guardianship.56 The Code Civil also
recognized the notion of diminished legal capacity; in such cases, a
legal statement made by the person under guardianship was subject to
the guardian’s approval.57 Based on examples from the Roman law, the
Code Civil declared unilateral legal statements by persons with
diminished active legal capacity as invalid.58
The above model was repeated in the Austrian Civil Code
(Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), proclaimed seven years later in
1811 and entered into force in 1812.59 Under Section 273 of the
Austrian Civil Code, the mentally ill had active legal capacity but were
under guardianship.60 The Austrian Civil Code regulated diminished
active legal capacity in a manner similar to that of the Code Civil. Thus,
the legal transactions of a person with diminished active legal capacity
were subject to the approval of a guardian. 61 Furthermore, the Austrian
Civil Code also applied the invalidity of unilateral acts in certain areas.62
Perhaps the clearest instance of legal incompetence derived from
Roman jurisprudence and reflecting the medical advances of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is found in the German Civil Code
(Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), which was adopted in 1896 and entered into
force in 1900.63 Under Section 104 of the original German Civil Code, a
person of seven years of age or less, or an individual who was unable to
express his will or who had been rendered a person under guardianship
due to mental illness, had no active legal capacity.64
Sections 114 and 115 of the original German Civil Code
prescribed restrictions on the active legal capacity of minors aged
between seven and eighteen and of individuals with mental disability or
illness or addiction (the latter included alcoholism and nicotine

55. See 1 ÉMILE ACOLLAS, MANUEL DE DROIT CIVIL: A L’USAGE DES ETUDIANTS
[HANDBOOK OF CIVIL LAW FOR STUDENTS] 411 (1869).
56. HENRY CACHARD, THE FRENCH CIVIL CODE, WITH VARIOUS AMENDMENTS THERETO:
AS IN FORCE ON MARCH 15, 1895 121 (1895).
57. Id. at 111, 125.
58. Varul et al., supra note 5, at 104.
59. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL LAW FROM ROMAN LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note 23, at
103–06.
60. ALLGEMEINES BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [ABGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 273 (Austria).
61. EUGEN BLEULER, LEHRBUCH DER PSYCHIATRIE [TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY] 674–75
(Manfred Bleuler ed., 15th ed. 1983) (Ger.).
62. Id. at 675.
63. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL LAW FROM ROMAN LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note 23, at
96–97.
64. CHUNG HUI WANG, THE GERMAN CIVIL CODE 23 (1907).
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addiction according to the text of the original Code).65 Similarly, here,
active legal capacity was subject to guardianship provisions.66 In other
words, the approval of a guardian was required; legal transactions based
on statements made by such persons were subject to the invalidity of the
unilateral statements rule, negotium claudicans, whereby the
incompetence of a person could only be cited as grounds for
invalidating a legal transaction in the interest of the person.67 Moreover,
under labor law68 and inheritance law, some legal statements were still
considered invalid even when they had been approved by the guardian. 69
The great codes of civil law represented an advance in the sense
that they recognized and prescribed the general and full passive legal
capacity of people with disabilities. Even so, reflecting Roman law and
the state of medical knowledge, jurisprudence in the period continued to
define persons with intellectual disabilities and the mentally ill as
lacking active legal capacity.70 They were made subject to guardians
who represented them fully and in all areas.71
Concerning addictions and other disabilities regarded as less
serious by medicine, the above great codes of civil law made reference
to restricted active legal capacity, thus offering a degree of
independence to persons under guardianship.72 However, in all major
legal transactions, the approval of the legal representatives (guardians)
was a prerequisite.73 In the field of labor law and inheritance law, the
invalidity of unilateral statements usually applied.74
B. Passive and Active Legal Capacity in Hungarian Law
1. Passive and Active Legal Capacity in Feudal Hungarian Law
Until the introduction of the Hungarian Civil Code, Hungarian law
was based on common law. That is to say, there were no codified

Id. at 25.
Id. at 23, 25.
Id.
HORVÁTH ISTVÁN, MUNKAJOG [LABOR LAW] 32–34 (2007) (Hung.).
HANS BROX, ALLGEMEINER TEIL DES BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCHS [GENERAL PART
OF THE CIVIL CODE] 105–12 (2., erg. Aufl. 1978) (Ger.).
70. See Varul et al., supra note 5, at 102.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 103.
73. Id. at 104.
74. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW app. B (2009) (discussing the
various states’ rejection of unilateral statements).
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
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rules.75 Instead, various documents of common law played a decisive
role.76 Werbőczy’s Tripartitum was the first major survey of Hungarian
common law.77
The Tripartitum suggests that in principle, disability did not
influence the legal capacity of people under feudal status law.78
Although Werbőczy’s Tripartitum sought to apply the dogma and
terminology of Roman law to Hungarian law, it nevertheless differed
dogmatically from works based on traditional Roman law.79 Under
Roman law, the principal distinction between custody and guardianship
was that custody served as a replacement for parental authority, while
guardianship sought to provide a representative for a person with
diminished active legal capacity.80 In contrast, in customary Hungarian
civil law, custody and guardianship were distinguished according to
whether there was a requirement to care for the person, in addition to
the supervision of property. Where there was such a requirement, the
relationship was one of custody; otherwise, it was one of guardianship.81
Thus, under Hungarian feudal customary law, persons with intellectual
disabilities were placed under custody while “wayward fools” were
placed under guardianship.82
These provisions, however, did not represent a real difference as
far as active legal capacity was concerned, since in both instances, the
legal regulations of property relating to guardianship were applied. As
far as property law was concerned, custody and guardianship status
were similar to diminished active legal capacity, since the ward (the
person under guardianship) was limited in the extent to which he could
make legal statements.83

75. Kazimierz Grzybowski, Reform of Civil Law in Hungary, Poland, and the Soviet Union,
10 AM. J. COMP. L. 253, 253 (1961).
76. Id.; BELIZNAY ET AL., supra note 44, at 73–75.
77. IGNÁC FRANK, A KÖZIGAZSÁG TÖRVÉNYE MAGYARHONBAN [HUNGARIAN PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE LAW] 64–66, 179, 183–85 (1845).
78. See THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL LAW FROM ROMAN LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note
23, at 67.
79. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN CIVIL LAW, supra note 23, at 79–80.
80. FÖLDI & HAMZA, supra note 24, at 264.
81. ISTVÁN WERBÖCZI, TRIPARTITUM, translated in THE CUSTOMARY LAW OF THE
RENOWNED KINGDOM OF HUNGARY: A WORK IN THREE PARTS, THE “TRIPARTITUM” (Janos M.
Bak et al. eds., 2005).
82. FRANK, supra note 77, at 179.
83. Id. at 183–85.
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2. Civil Law in the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century
In the second half of the nineteenth century, the above rigid
regulations restricting the freedom of a ward of custody or a person
under guardianship were significantly relaxed, principally as a
consequence of the adoption of Act XX of 1877. In addition, the terms
custody and guardianship were redefined.84 In the evolving civil law
(which was based on customary law), a differentiation was made
between the two legal forms—a differentiation which had come from
Roman law into the civil law systems.85 As a result, adults could now
only be under guardianship.86
The German and Austrian models were the primary influences on
the development of Hungarian civil law.87 Thus, based on judicial
practice, in addition to minors aged under twelve years, “lunatics” (to
use the contemporary term) and “those with temporary mental
disturbances” were placed under custody with no active legal capacity.88
Persons aged between twelve and twenty-four years and “the weakminded, deaf-dumb, and wayward fools” were placed under custody
with restricted active legal capacity.89 Based on the above, one can see
that Hungarian law included some of the strictest restrictions in
Europe—in Hungary, even a serious hearing or speech disability was
considered grounds for restricted active legal capacity. 90 These highly
restrictive rules were altered by a civil law bill, whose provisions were
applied by the courts even though they were only adopted and not
proclaimed by the Lower House of the National Assembly.91 The new
provisions included, almost word for word, the stipulations of the

84. See 1877. évi XX. törvény a gyámsági és gondnoksági ügyek rendezéséről [Act XX of
1877 on the Settlement of Guardianship and Guardianship Matters] § 28 (Hung.); SZLADITS,
supra note 8, at 80–81.
85. SZLADITS, supra note 8, at 173 (describing the evolution of the Hungarian system and
the influence of Roman and customary Hungarian law).
86. See THE HUNGARIAN DISABILITY CAUCUS, DISABILITY RIGHTS OR DISABLING
RIGHTS? 148 (2010), available at http://mdac.info/sites/mdac.info/files/English_Disability%20
Rights%20or%20Disabling%20Rights%20CRPD%20Alternative%20Report.pdf (custody only
used to refer to children’s being in the custody of their parents; otherwise the “custody” of the
adult disabled is referred to as “guardianship”).
87. SZLADITS, supra note 8, at 173 (“Through the influence of Austrian institutions and
doctrine, the spirit of Roman-German law systems begins to penetrate, considerably altering the
original character of our private law.”).
88. ÁRMIN FODOR, MAGYAR MAGÁNJOG [HUNGARIAN CIVIL LAW] 311 (1903).
89. Id. at 310–11.
90. Id.
91. See Grzybowski, supra note 75, at 253.
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German Civil Code relating to active legal capacity and restricted active
legal capacity.92
In the latter half of the nineteenth century and the early years of the
twentieth century, Hungarian civil law clearly followed the pattern set
by German law.93 Thus, in Hungary too, the traditional medical
approach to active legal capacity was applied. Moreover, the rules of
legal protection were also similar.94
3. The Operative Hungarian Civil Code
Although prescribed as early as 1848, the codification of
Hungarian civil law did not take place until 1959 with the adoption of
the operative Hungarian Civil Code.95 The Code’s approach to the
regulation of passive and active legal capacity was a modern one.
In line with traditional civil law, the 1959 act made a distinction—
with regard to adults—between custody without active legal capacity
and custody with diminished active legal capacity. 96 This distinction
was based on whether or not a cognitive incapacity was present, which
was normally verified by a medical opinion.97 As far as diminished
active legal capacity was concerned, the legal protection measures
employed in the nineteenth century codes were used. 98 Even so,
reflecting an attempt to respond to the challenges of the era, the
Hungarian Civil Code recognized the validity of the everyday legal
transactions of persons with diminished active legal capacity.99
4. Provisions in Constitutional and Labor Law Relating to Active Legal
Capacity
Having surveyed the rules of Hungarian civil law relating to active
legal capacity, owing to their special significance, we now examine the
92. See 1959. évi IV törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvről [Act IV of 1959 on the Civil Code]
§ 14 (Hung.); see also THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL LAW FROM ROMAN LEGAL TRADITIONS,
supra note 23, at 138–39.
93. CATHERINE DUPRÉ, IMPORTING THE LAW IN POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITIONS: THE
HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT AND THE RIGHT TO HUMAN DIGNITY 95 (2003).
94. See MENTAL DISABILITY ADVOCACY CTR., NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS OF
THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES 2 (2008), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/disability/docs/consultation/Civilsocietyinputs/hungary
MDAC.doc [hereinafter MDAC REPORT].
95. THE DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN CIVIL LAW, supra note 23, at 177.
96. See 1959. évi IV törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvről [Act IV of 1959 on the Civil Code]
§ 14 (Hung.).
97. Id. § 15(5).
98. Hungary: Parliament Reforms Legal Capacity Laws, supra note 17.
99. LENKOVICS & SZÉKELY, supra note 27, at 27.
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development of provisions in constitutional law (electoral law) and
labor law relating to the active legal capacity of persons with
intellectual disabilities in the twentieth century.
When voting rights became universal, there was no change in the
rule that a person under limited or full custody had neither active nor
passive voting rights.100
As a consequence of its roots in civil law, labor law tended to
apply the civil law notion of active legal capacity, which resulted in
situations that were difficult to interpret.101 This was true, above all, in
the case of persons under custody with no active legal capacity, which is
often the case even today.102
By way of summary, we can state that Hungarian legal regulations
historically have tended to follow European examples, and that in the
modern era, Hungarian law has adopted contemporary regulations
which assist the country’s modernization.
III. A NEW APPROACH IN MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL AND CIVIL LAW TO
THE PASSIVE AND ACTIVE LEGAL CAPACITY OF PERSONS WITH
INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES
A. The Constitutional Legal Basis of Provisions Relating to the Passive
and Active Legal Capacity of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities
The constitutional legal approach to the rights of persons with
intellectual disabilities appeared in the second half of the twentieth
century in industrialized countries.103 In part, there were historical
reasons for this—the dictatorial governments of the first half of the
twentieth century had grossly abused the rights of persons with
disabilities. In this context, we cite the so-called “euthanasia” program
in Germany, whereby the Nazis murdered tens of thousands of persons
with moderate or severe intellectual disabilities.104
In addition to such historical reasons, the issue also became more
salient as persons with disabilities were assisted by technological
developments to become active members of society. In view of such

100. See Hungary: Parliament Reforms Legal Capacity Laws, supra note 17.
101. See id.
102. A MAGYAR MUNKAJOG I. [HUNGARIAN LABOR LAW VOL. I] 79–80 (Csilla Kollonay
Lehoczyné ed., 2001).
103. See Jerome E. Bickenbach, Disability Human Rights, Law, and Policy, in HANDBOOK
OF DISABILITY STUDIES 565, 571 (Gary L. Albrecht et al. eds., 2001).
104. Mosaic of Victims: An Overview, U.S. HOLOCAUST MUSEUM, http://www.ushmm.org/
wlc/en/article.php?ModuleId=10005149 (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
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developments, the need arose to catalogue the rights of persons with
disabilities and establish rules governing their legal protection.105
Special legislation guaranteeing the rights of persons with
disabilities was first adopted in the common law countries106 where, due
to the aforementioned notion of legal capacity, the legal system offered
broader opportunities for actions on behalf of persons with intellectual
disabilities.107 In these countries, the legal system enabled legislation
imposing an effective ban on discrimination. In the United States, the
United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, disability legislation was
aimed primarily at preventing discrimination and ensuring equal
opportunities.108
In addition to the fight against discrimination, greater emphasis
was given to ensuring the human dignity of people with disabilities, 109
which entailed the introduction of provisions addressing the problems of
people with disabilities in their complexity. Going beyond the antidiscrimination rules, the aim was to establish a kind of catalogue of
rights for persons with disabilities and to ensure the application of these
rights in all walks of life and in all areas of legislation. Among such
legislations, the Hungarian Act on the Rights and Equal Opportunities
of Persons with Disabilities (Act XXVI of 1998) had a pioneering
significance, as it was one of the first pieces of legislation in the world
to apply the holistic model of disability.110 A similar model was applied
by Germany when drafting its legislation on the equality of people with
disabilities.111
The process of securing the rights of people with disabilities also
significantly influenced the adoption of provisions concerning the active

105. TAMÁS GYULAVÁRI & GYÖRGY KÖNCZEI, EURÓPAI SZOCIÁLIS JOG [EUROPEAN SOCIAL
LAW] 10 (2000) (Hung.).
106. See Michael L. Perlin, International Human Rights Law and Comparative Disability
Law: The Role of Institutional Psychiatry in the Suppression of Political Dissent, 39 ISR. L. REV.
69, 75–85 (2006), available at http://www.narpa.org/MLP-IHR-ILR.pdf.
107. See Bickenbach, supra note 103, at 569.
108. See id.
109. See Mark Priestley, In Search of European Disability Policy: Between National and
Global, in 1 EUR. J. DISABILITY RES. 61, 63–64 (2007).
110. ISTVÁN HOFFMAN, ÖNKORMÁNYZATI KÖZSZOLGÁLTATÁSOK SZERVEZÉSE ÉS
IGAZGATÁSA [MUNICIPAL ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC SERVICES] 228–29
(2009) (Hung.).
111. The sedes materiae for social services for people with disability is the twelfth Book of
the German Social Code (Sozialgesetzbuch). The German Bundestag adopted an independent act
on the equality of the persons with disabilities in 2002 (Behindertengleichstellungsgesetz). See
RAINER WAGNER & DANIEL KAISER, EINFÜHRUNG IN DAS BEHINDERTENRECHT
[INTRODUCTION TO DISABILITY LAW] 97–98 (2004) (Ger.).
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legal capacity of persons with intellectual disabilities.112 It is now
generally accepted that the application of basic rights and the operation
of a democratic community are not possible if broad sections of the
population are excluded from participation in society because they have
been defined as lacking active legal capacity.
B. Changes in Modern Civil Law Affecting the Passive and Active
Legal Capacity of Persons with Intellectual Disabilities
The second half of the twentieth century saw changes in the
passive and active legal capacity of persons with intellectual
disabilities.113 The departure point was the fundamental rights approach
to the rights of persons with disabilities.114 Following the adoption of
legislation in the 1980s and 1990s based primarily on the ban of
discrimination and the right to human dignity,115 there was a
reconsideration of the provisions of civil law governing the withdrawal
or restriction of a person’s active legal capacity.116
The process had several phases. First, civil law codifications in the
mid-twentieth century—for example, the operative Hungarian Civil
Code (Act IV of 1959)—enabled the everyday transactions, such as
buying food, of persons without capacity to function as valid legal
transactions.117 This model was also applied in the recently enacted
Section 105a of the German Civil Code.118 According to the code, even
though the transactions of persons without capacity are invalid under
the primary rule contained in Section 105, the transactions of adult
persons without capacity that are necessary for satisfying their everyday
needs do have legal effect, as long as the value and the consideration are
proportionate and the transaction does not jeopardize the interests of the
person without capacity.119 The second change, in the final third of the
twentieth century, was the redefinition of the notion of incompetence.120
112. See Varul et al., supra note 5, at 99–100, 102–04, 107.
113. Id. at 102–04.
114. See Lang, supra note 12, at 268–70.
115. Id.
116. Varul et al., supra note 5, at 102–04.
117. 1959. évi IV törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvről § 14 [Act IV of 1959 on the Civil
Code] (Hung.).
118. BÜRGERLICHES
GESETZBUCH
[BGB]
[CIVIL
CODE],
Jan.
2,
2002,
BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil I [BGBL. I] 42, 2909, as amended, § 105a (Ger.), available at
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/englisch_bgb.html.
119. See THOMAS ZERRES, BÜRGERLICHES RECHT: EIN EINFÜHRENDES LEHRBUCH IN DAS
ZIVIL- UND ZIVILPROZESSRECHT [CIVIL LAW: AN INTRODUCTORY TEXTBOOK IN CIVIL LAW
AND PROCEDURE] 79–81 (2005).
120. Jones & Basser Marks, supra note 18, at 5.
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This primarily entailed a restructuring of the previous threefold
division—age, the inability to express one’s will, and mental illness or
intellectual disability.121 During this phase, as far as the definition of the
notion of incompetence was concerned, the social approach became
definitive.122 These provisions defined people who were unable to
participate in society for various reasons, including intellectual
disability or mental illness, as incapable of expressing free will or
making a legal statement.123
The third phase in the process was a redefinition of the notion of
diminished active legal capacity.124 Under traditional civil law,
diminished active legal capacity meant that among persons of limited
cognitive reliability (due to age, intellectual disability, or mental
illness), the consent of those exercising parental supervision or
authority, such as custodians (or guardians, in the case of adults), was
required for certain major legal transactions.125 Until the civil law
reforms in the late twentieth century, this restriction applied to all
aspects of life.126 It was in the common law countries that the
opportunity first arose for only limited restrictions on legal autonomy of
individuals.127 Where this innovation was applied, the consent of a
guardian was necessary only with respect to those activities where the
courts had ordered a restriction.128 In all other transactions, the
individual in question had full active legal capacity.129
The early twenty-first century saw a restructuring of the legal
forms of restricted active legal capacity.130 Several models have arisen
in this area as well.
One of the models is based on the notion of legal capacity to be
found in the common law countries and in English family law. 131 Since
legal capacity in the common law system embodies both passive and
active legal capacity, the model prescribed the removal of the traditional
121. Id; cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 cmt. b & c (1981) (discussing
capacity to contract, types of incapacity, and inability to assent).
122. Mulvany, supra note 7, at 39–40.
123. See Varul et al., supra note 5, at 100; Jones & Basser Marks, supra note 18, at 5.
124. See Varul et al., supra note 5, at 106.
125. See id. at 105–06.
126. See id. at 102.
127. Lang, supra note 12, at 268; see, e.g., PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 22, at 7–9.
128. See Varul et al., supra note 5, at 107.
129. See id. at 101–02. This model is a good example for the theory of spheres of legal
capacity (Sphärengeschäftsfähigkeit) in German civil law and jurisprudence. See JÜRGEN PLATE,
DAS GESAMTE EXAMENSRELEVANTE ZIVILRECHT: FÜR STUDENTEN UND RECHTSREFERENDARE
[COMPLETE EXAM-TESTED CIVIL LAW: FOR STUDENTS AND LAW CLERKS] 365–66 (2005).
130. See Varul et al., supra note 5, at 100.
131. See id.
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notion of legal incompetence.132 Under this model, which has appeared
primarily in the law of former British colonies such as Canada, New
Zealand, and Australia, all persons with disabilities have a certain
capacity to act.133 Hence, in various areas and in certain legal matters,
they have full capacity or their opinions must at least be taken into
consideration. The application of this model assisted the implementation
of the fundamental rights of persons with disabilities, mentioned in
Subsection A of Part 1 of III. Full incompetence was effectively deemed
a restriction of their constitutional rights.134 Thus, the countries adhering
to this model adopted the legal position that it is incompatible with the
framework of a democratic State if the active legal capacity of certain
persons is restricted to such a degree that fundamental rights cannot be
applied.135 It was also considered necessary in the common law model
that there should be legal means of offering assistance to such persons
as they make their decisions, and that such means of assistance should
respect their integrity and autonomy.136
In addition to the common law countries, the model has also
appeared in Europe. For example, it was applied in the Estonian draft
bill of 2002, which proposed an amendment to the General Provisions
of the Estonian Civil Code adopted in 1994.137 The bill sought the
abolition of full guardianship (with no active legal capacity), but it was
rejected by the Estonian legislature.138
The complete withdrawal of a person’s active legal capacity—or a
restricted active legal capacity where all legal transactions are subject to
the restriction with the exception of everyday transactions—was
regarded as incompatible with fundamental constitutional rights in the
common law countries.139 This also became the position under the
German model, which expanded the freedom of persons with
disabilities to make decisions as well.140 In the revised German Civil
132. See id.
133. See Bickenbach, supra note 103, at 569.
134. See Lang, supra note 12, at 268–70.
135. See Varul et al, supra note 5, at 104; Nancy J. Knauer, Defining Capacity: Balancing
the Competing Interests of Autonomy and Need, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 321, 347
(2003).
136. See Varul et al., supra note 5, at 103. Thus, for persons with various psycho-social
disabilities, the legal system and administrative practice have elaborated many means of
assistance in a variety of areas. For information about assistance granted to people with reading
disabilities at the time of elections, see Marcus Redley, Citizens with Learning Disabilities and
the Right to Vote, 23 DISABILITY & SOC’Y 375, 376–79 (2008).
137. FÖLDI & HAMZA, supra note 24, at 249.
138. See Varul, supra note 5, at 99, 103.
139. See DIMOPOULOS, supra note 16, at 69.
140. ZERRES, supra note 119, at 79.
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Code, guardianship without active legal capacity theoretically has not
been abolished, even though Section 105a allows for persons without
active legal capacity under guardianship to proceed independently in
everyday transactions.141 But the rules on guardianship for persons
without active legal capacity were abrogated in the German Code of
Civil Procedure (Zivilprozessordnung (ZPO)).142
Nevertheless, with the abrogation of Sections 113–115,
guardianship with diminished active legal capacity was replaced by the
institution of assisted decision-making not restricting active legal
capacity. Under the amended Section 1897 of the German Civil Code,
assisted decision-making can be ordered by a court with responsibility
for matters of guardianship, but only in specific spheres of authority, not
generally.143 Courts may also appoint different “supporters” (“carers”)
for different spheres of authority; another possibility is that the tasks of
a supporter are carried out by an association or an official authority. 144
The nomination is subject to the agreement of the supported person, and
the German Civil Code regards the relationship between a person with
disabilities and his or her supporter as one of trust. The amended
sections of the code lay down special procedural rules for major issues,
such as choosing where to live, signing a rent agreement, or making
certain legal statements pertaining to healthcare.145
These models have exerted a major influence on the recent
codification of rights of the person, and a consideration of their basic
features has also led to the development of mixed models, combining
elements of the two concepts.146
In modern civil rights, the classical formulas of the nineteenth
century that were based on Roman law (or on traditional common law
in common law countries) have been replaced by a new approach,
owing in large part to changes in the area of constitutional rights.147
Since the mid-twentieth century, the rigid provisions governing
incompetence and diminished active legal capacity have been relaxed
by ensuring the right to proceed in everyday transactions and by
amending the notions of incompetence and restricted active legal
capacity in the sense that active legal capacity is now determined for the
141.
142.
2005).
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
See INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 268–69 (J. Zekoll & M. Reimann eds., 2d ed.
Id. at 269.
See id.
See id.
See Lang, supra note 12, at 268–70.
HUNGARIAN LABOR LAW VOL. I, supra note 102, at 79–80.
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various fields of authority. In the civil law legislation of the early
twenty-first century, we can distinguish two main models with respect
to the above notions: the common law model, which has effectively
abolished guardianship without active legal capacity and now only
recognizes restricted active legal capacity, 148 and the German model,
which has introduced assisted decision-making as a replacement for the
institution of guardianship with diminished active legal capacity.149
IV. THE UNITED NATIONS’ CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS
WITH DISABILITIES AND THE OPTIONAL PROTOCOL
In Subsection A of Part III, we noted that at the beginning of the
twenty-first century, there was increasing acceptance throughout the
international community of the need for national legislation to guarantee
the rights of persons with disabilities and of the duty of governments to
ensure the application of these rights.
With regard for national legislative efforts and developments in
European Community law in this field150 and, following an initiative by
the international disability organizations, work began on drafting a
global disability convention under the auspices of the United Nations.151
As a result of several years of preparatory work, the United Nations
General Assembly adopted the CRPD and its Optional Protocol on
December 13, 2006.152 In 2007, Hungary became the second country to
ratify the Convention (Act XCII of 2007).153
The Convention contains a partial catalogue of the rights of
persons with disabilities. Article 12 of the Convention contains
provisions relating to legal capacity and the exercising of legal
capacity.154
For a proper interpretation of Article 12, it is necessary once again
to refer to the notion of legal capacity as it is understood in common
law systems. In common law systems with their procedural legal
148. See Varul et al., supra note 5, at 104.
149. See INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW, supra note 142, at 269.
150. See, e.g., Council Directive 2000/78, Establishing a General Framework for Equal
Treatment in Employment and Occupation, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16 (EC); Council Regulation
1107/2006, Concerning the Rights of Disabled Persons and Persons with Reduced Mobility When
Traveling by Air, 2006 O.J. (L 204) 1 (EC); see also Anne Waldschmidt, Disability Policy of the
European Union: The Supranational Level, 3 EUR. J. DISABILITY RES. 8, 13–14 (2009)
(discussing European Union disability policy and its possible disconnect with social policy).
151. Lang, supra note 12, at 271.
152. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, U.N. ENABLE, http://www.un.org/
disabilities/default.asp?navid=13&pid=150 (last visited Oct. 15, 2011).
153. MDAC REPORT, supra note 94, at 2.
154. CRPD, supra note 2, art. 12; DIMOPOULOS, supra note 16, at 72.
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approach, an entitlement (right) must entail a right to sue.155 Similarly to
the capacity to sue and be sued of the Hungarian Civil Procedure
Code,156 passive legal capacity and active legal capacity are closely
linked in common law countries for this reason.
Legal capacity is used in Article 12 of the Convention, which
relates to equality before the law.157 The strong influence of the legal
system introduced to many parts of the world under the former British
Empire and the incompatibility of this system with the civil law system
(including differences of terminology) meant that translators of the
Convention were faced with a difficult task. With respect to Article 12,
it should be emphasized that the aim was to broaden the decisionmaking powers of persons with disabilities (in particular, persons with
intellectual disabilities) in order to ensure their human dignity,
independence, and ability to express opinions.158
Having regard for the close connection between the common law
notion of legal capacity and the civil law notion of active legal capacity
(capacity to act), one should note that Article 12(1) of the Convention
provides that persons with disabilities have the right to recognition
everywhere as persons before the law.159 This provision was important
because the traditional legal systems in some United Nations member
States fail to recognize people with disabilities as persons before the
law.160
The provisions of Article 12(2)–(5) aim to maximize the decisionmaking autonomy of persons with disabilities, permitting only
necessary and proportional restrictions.161 In civil law systems, decisionmaking autonomy indicates the presence of an active legal capacity.
Thus, these provisions of the article clearly relate to active legal
capacity. Reflecting modern legal development, the Convention seeks to
ensure that active legal capacity is restricted only under exceptional
155. FÖLDI & HAMZA, supra note 24, at 155, 203, 228–29, 264 (2001).
156. AN EXPLANATION OF THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 30, at 252–53.
157. CRPD, supra note 2, art. 12, ¶ 2.
158. DIMOPOULOS, supra note 16, at 72. Regarding the theoretical background of the
paradigm shift of the CRPD, see GERARD QUINN ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND DISABILITY: THE
CURRENT USE AND FUTURE POTENTIAL OF UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS IN
THE CONTEXT OF DISABILITY 29–46 (2002), available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Publications/HRDisabilityen.pdf.
159. CRPD, supra note 2, art. 12, ¶ 1.
160. See KATHERINE GUERNSEY ET AL., CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH
DISABILITIES: ITS IMPLEMENTATION AND RELEVANCE FOR THE WORLD BANK 1 (2007),
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOCIALPROTECTION/Resources/SP-Discussion
-papers/Disability-DP/0712.pdf.
161. CRPD, supra note 2, art. 12, ¶¶ 2–5.
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circumstances in order to minimize the possibility of abuse.
Furthermore, in place of restrictions, it proposes assisted decisionmaking wherever possible.162
In light of the above, we can state that the Convention aims to
extend the results of recent developments in civil law to areas beyond
the countries where the model has already been successfully
established, thereby promoting the decision-making autonomy of
persons with intellectual disabilities. Wherever possible, the Convention
seeks to establish means for replacing the institution of guardianship,
which restricts or obstructs independent decision-making.
V. HUNGARIAN LAW—WITH SPECIAL REGARD FOR THE PRONOUNCED
BUT NOT OPERATIVE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE
A. The Laws in Force
Surveying the provisions of the Convention, which have now been
incorporated into Hungarian law, we may ask whether the operative
domestic Hungarian law satisfies the obligations contained in
Article 12. The summary answer is that it does not, but it is attempting
to do so.
The provisions governing active legal capacity have recently
undergone substantial changes in order to ensure the human rights of
persons with intellectual disabilities as much as possible.
An important change was the 2001 amendment (Act XV of 2001)
to the provisions of the Hungarian Civil Code relating to active legal
capacity. According to the ministerial argument, the amendment was
made in reflection of Council of Europe Recommendation R (99) 4 of
February 23, 1999, on Principles Concerning the Legal Protection of
Incapable Adults.163 The amendment to the Hungarian Civil Code
altered the rules governing restricted active legal capacity. 164 Under the
amendment, a court can only impose a restriction in certain fields of
authority.165 The active legal capacity of an adult remains complete in
areas that are not subject to the court-imposed restriction.166
162. Id. pmbl., (o).
163. KÖRÖS ANDRÁS, „JÓT S JÓL!”—HELYES CÉLOK, ALKALMATLAN MEGOLDÁSOK A
CSELEKVÖKÉPESSÉG TERVEZETT SZABÁLYOZÁSÁBAN [“GOOD AND WELL!”—GOOD GOALS,
INADEQUATE SOLUTIONS IN THE PROPOSED RULES ON ACTIVE LEGAL CAPACITY] 4, available at
http://www.efoesz.hu/download/ptk_ koros_cikk.pdf.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Practically, Hungary implemented the German theory of Sphärengeschäftsfähigkeit
[spheres of legal capacity]. See PLATE, supra note 129, at 365–66.
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In addition to amending the substantive legal provisions of the
Hungarian Civil Code, the provisions relating to the procedure for
guardianship were also altered.167 First, guardianships were made
subject to compulsory review, in the course of which the subject of
guardianship is to be heard unless there are exceptional
circumstances.168 The aim of these provisions is to ensure that
restrictions of a person’s active legal capacity are indeed necessary and
proportional.
Act XV of 2001 resulted in a paradigm shift in the legal provisions
relating to active legal capacity, as both the Hungarian Civil Code and
the Code of Civil Procedure dispensed with the model of the nineteenthcentury codifications.169
It should be noted that the change in approach took place only at
the level of civil law.170 Courts rarely make use of the institution of
partially diminished active legal capacity; moreover, public legal
provisions were not adjusted to this system.171 This is particularly
evident in the area of electoral law. A person without active legal
capacity or with diminished active legal capacity has neither active nor
passive voting rights, even when the guardianship restricting his or her
active legal capacity does not extend to withdrawal of public legal
entitlements.172 Under the Hungarian Civil Code, however, he or she
would theoretically be completely capable.173
Although they represent a substantial advancement in comparison
to previous regulations, the above provisions of the Hungarian Civil
Code are not in accord with the provisions of Article 12 of the CRDP.
First, the Hungarian Civil Code permits active legal capacity to be
restricted or even denied in many instances, thereby obstructing the
decision-making autonomy of persons with intellectual disabilities.174

167. Körös, supra note 163, at 4.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 5.
170. Id.
171. See Hungary: Parliament Reforms Legal Capacity Laws, supra note 17. In Hungary
there are approximately 80,000 people under guardianship, and approximately 40,000 of these
people are under guardianship without active legal capacity. See id.
172. See Art. 70. of the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary [Act XX of 1949], Art. 17 of
the Act on Electoral Procedure [Act C of 1997]; MÁRTA DEZSŐ ET AL., ALKOTMÁNYTAN I.
[CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, VOL. I] 189 (István Kukorelli ed., 2003.)
173. See Hungary: Parliament Reforms Legal Capacity Laws, supra note 17.
174. Körös, supra note 163, at 4–7.
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Second, it does not provide a direct access to legal assistant,
independent of the guardian.175
B. The Provisions of the New, Pronounced but Not Operative,
Hungarian Civil Code
Hungarian compliance with the Convention was to be achieved
through the adoption of a new Hungarian Civil Code, which was
pronounced as Act CXX of 2009.176 This Act is no longer operative—
the Hungarian Constitution Court annulled Act XV of 2010 on
operation of Act CXX of 2010 on the Hungarian Civil Code because of
the violation of legal certainty.177 The 51st Constitutional Court
Resolution of 2010 (28th April) stated that the two-month preparation
time for the operation of the first two books of the new Hungarian Civil
Code was too short, and annulled the Operation Act of the new
Hungarian Civil Code.178
In Subsection B of Part III, we briefly examined the main models
seeking to extend the decision-making autonomy of persons with
intellectual disabilities. Among these, the abolition of guardianship with
no active legal capacity was the most common method employed in the
common law countries,179 while in the German-speaking countries, the
institution of guardianship with no active legal capacity has been partly
retained, but restricted guardianship has been replaced by assisted
decision-making, which enhances autonomy by providing appropriate
and effective assistance rather than restricting a person’s decisionmaking powers.180
In regard to the above models, the pronounced but not operative
New Hungarian Civil Code may be regarded as a mixed system: first, it
175. 2009. évi CXX törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvröl [Act CXX of 2009 on the Civil
Code] § 2.25 (Hung.).
176. HUNGARIAN ASS’N FOR PERS. WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES (ÉFOÉSZ),
SUPPORTED DECISION-MAKING OR PLENARY GUARDIANSHIP?—HUNGARIAN LEGAL CAPACITY
REFORM CAME TO A SUDDEN STOP (May 5, 2010), available at http://www.dpiap.org/resources/
pdf/Hungarian_legal_capacity_reform_10_05_14.pdf.
177. The New Civil Code Will Not Enter Into Force as of May 1, 2010, SALANS NEWS
(Salans LLP, Budapest), Apr. 27, 2010, available at http://www.salans.com/~/media/Assets/
Salans/Publications/2010/NewsletterThe%20new%20Civil%20Code%20will%20not%20enter%2
0into%20force%20as%20of%20May%201%202010.ashx
178. See generally Alkotmánybíróság (AB) [Constitutional Court], Apr. 26, 2010,
436/B/2010, http://isz.mkab.hu/netacgi/ahawkere2009.pl?s1=51/2010&s2=&s3=&s4=&s5=&s6=
&s7=&s8=&s9=&s10=&s11=Dr&r=1&SECT5=AHAWKERE&op9=and&op10=and&d=AHA
W&op8=and&l=20&u=/netahtml/ahawuj/ahawkere.htm&p=1&op11=and&op7=and&f=G
(Hung.).
179. PLATE, supra note 129, at 365–66.
180. INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW, supra note 142, at 269.
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abolishes guardianship with no active legal capacity, recognizing only
restricted guardianship.181 Second, as a replacement for restricted
guardianship, it provides other legal forms that do not affect a person’s
active legal capacity; in this area, it adheres almost word for word to the
provisions of the amended German Civil Code, which introduced
assisted decision-making, prior legal statement, and guardianship
without diminished active legal capacity. 182 The new Hungarian Civil
Code lists those matters in respect to which guardianship can be
imposed.183 It also seems to try to address longstanding problems
relating to active legal capacity in the field of labor law and
employment of workers with intellectual disabilities.
These progressive provisions of the pronounced but not operative
Hungarian Civil Code should ensure that Hungarian law more or less
conforms to the provisions of the Convention.184 Owing to the
substantial restrictions contained in the provisions, however, certain
regulatory elements may lead to results that were not anticipated in the
Convention. For instance, where an adult has been placed under a
guardianship without a restriction of his or her active legal capacity,
theoretically the person would be able to marry even without the
consent of the appointed guardian, which is usually the parent.
In connection with the above provisions of the new Hungarian
Civil Code, it should be reiterated that when the Code is adopted, the
public legal provisions governing active legal capacity would also have
to be amended. The enhancement of active legal capacity in civil law
will create an ambiguous situation, unless provisions are adopted to
enable the person’s effective participation in society and involvement in
the community.
By way of summary, despite a significant shift in the legislative
approach in 2001, current and operative Hungarian law does not comply
fully with the provisions of the Convention. The problem could be
resolved through the adoption of the new Hungarian Civil Code which
has been drafted recently, but even if this new code is adopted,
amendments to public legal provisions would still be required.
181. See Körös, supra note 163.
182. See id. at 8; INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW, supra note 142, at 269.
183. 2009. évi CXX törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvről [Act CXX of 2009 on the Civil
Code] § 2.25 (Hung.).
184. See Sándor Gurbai, A gondnokság alá helyezett személyek választójogának vizsgálata az
Emberi Jogok Európai Bíróságának a Kiss v. Magyarország ügyben meghozott ítélete alapján
[Examination of the Right of Persons Placed under Guardianship to Vote According to the
European Court of Human Rights’ Judgment in the Case of Kiss v. Hungary], 3 KÖZJOGI SZEMLE
[PUB. L. REV.], no. 4, Dec. 2008, at 34, 40 (2010).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The aim of this study has been to present the main regulatory
framework relating to passive and active legal capacity—a framework
that forms the basis for the participation in society of persons with
intellectual disabilities.
We tried, firstly, to determine the meaning of passive and active
legal capacity. It was underlined that the most important legal effect of
intellectual disability is the restriction or complete removal of active
legal capacity. We examined the role of active legal capacity (a capacity
to act) in the various legal systems and the reasons for restrictions. We
found that, initially, restrictions were placed on a person’s active legal
capacity because of a limited capacity to participate in society and
comply with the norms of the era.185 Then, as medicine developed, the
medical-physiological approach to disability became dominant but was
replaced in the second half of the twentieth century by the medical or
social approach to disability.186 It was established that a sharp distinction
between passive and active legal capacity is made only in civil law
systems based on Roman law.187 In common law systems, the general
term competency is used.188 That is to say, no real distinction is made
between passive and active legal capacity.
We then surveyed the legislative developments and historical
changes in universal and Hungarian history, from the classical period to
the mid-twentieth century. Examining the various models employed in
the major countries, we concluded that in traditional legal systems,
people with disabilities were sometimes denied passive legal capacity
and often their active legal capacity was not recognized. An exception
to this was the “lucidum intervallum” recognized in post-classical
Roman law, during which a person with disabilities was considered to
have full legal capacity.189 In the nineteenth century, alongside the
medical-physiological approach, there was a general recognition of the
passive legal capacity of persons with disabilities.190 Depending on the
gravity of impairment, however, their active legal capacity was
restricted partially or fully.191

185. See Varul et al., supra note 5, at 100.
186. Mulvany, supra note 7, at 39–40; Jones & Basser Marks, supra note 18, at 4–6.
187. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVIL LAW FROM ROMAN LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note 23, at
9–10; FÖLDI & HAMZA, supra note 24, at 155.
188. See, e.g., PARRY & DROGIN, supra note 22, at 7.
189. FÖLDI & HAMZA, supra note 24, at 228–29.
190. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 7–8 (Fr.).
191. LENKOVICS & SZÉKELY, supra note 27, at 27.
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The development of civil law and, in a related sense, constitutional
law resulted in substantial changes in the second half of the twentieth
century. In light of the inhumanity and grave abuse of the dictatorships
in the 1930s and 1940s,192 in the second half of the twentieth century,
various international legal agreements were established with provisions
relating to the rights of persons with disabilities.193 The initial approach
was to ensure the application of the ban on discrimination, but in the
1990s, there was an increasing acceptance that regulations should
address disability in a holistic manner.194 Since then, international law
has been developing in this direction as reflected in the United Nations
Convention of 2007.195
Starting in the 1970s, and concurrently with international legal
developments, common law countries began to adopt legislation on the
rights of persons with disabilities, with an aim to ensure the
implementation of the ban on discrimination.196 Following the example
of the common law countries, in the 1990s and the early years of the
twenty-first century, similar laws were passed in most advanced
democracies.197 Going beyond the original concept employed in the
common law countries, the more recent legislation has tended to be of a
complex nature—ensuring not only the application of the ban on
discrimination, but also the introduction of specific provisions relating
to disability.198
The fundamental rights approach of national legislation has
influenced civil law, too. Starting from the 1950s onward, persons with
diminished active legal capacity became increasingly able to undertake
the transactions necessary to address the needs of everyday life.199 This
change did not initially affect the basic elements of the regulatory
framework relating to active legal capacity.200 In the final three decades
of the twentieth century, however, the conditions were established for a
192. See John H. Noble Jr. & Vera H. Sharav, Protecting People with Decisional
Impairments and Legal Incapacity Against Biomedical Research Abuse, 18 J. DISABILITY POL’Y
STUD. 230, 231 (2008); MORRISON, supra note 10, at 39–40.
193. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
194. See Lang, supra note 12, at 270–71; HOFFMAN, supra note 110, at 228–29.
195. See CRPD, supra note 2, art. 1.
196. Lang, supra note 12, at 268–69.
197. Id. at 269.
198. See HOFFMAN, supra note 110, at 228–29; WAGNER & KAISER, supra note 111, at 97–
98.
199. See 1959. évi IV. törvény a Polgári Törvénykönyvről [Act IV of 1959 on the Civil Code]
(Hung.); see also FÁBIÁN & SÁGHY supra note 27, at 31–32.
200. Gurbai, supra note 184, at 34.
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paradigm shift.201 The changes initially affected the notion of
diminished active legal capacity; in place of a general restriction, there
were opportunities for the imposition of a partial restriction—a
restriction on certain areas of a person’s active legal capacity.202
In addition to the above changes, the 1990s saw the development
of several models based on the paradigm shift. In common law
countries, based on the principle of equality before the law, the
complete removal of legal capacity was ruled out; in most cases,
diminished legal capacity became the norm.203 In civil law countries
(particularly in Germany after a general revision of the German Civil
Code) a full restriction on active legal capacity was still possible so long
as there were opportunities for conducting the transactions necessary for
everyday life); nevertheless, the use of partial restrictions on active legal
capacity was expanded with the introduction of assisted decisionmaking.204 When implementing civil law reforms, other countries have
applied one of these two models, or a combination of both.205
In the second half of the twentieth century, Hungary attempted to
develop modern legislation reflecting the interests of people with
disabilities.206 Accordingly, under the Hungarian Civil Code, persons
with disabilities with diminished active legal capacity received the
ability to proceed in everyday transactions. 207 Hungary was the first
country in the world to adopt disability legislation regulating, in a
horizontal sense, the rights of persons with disabilities.208 Hungary was
also the second country to ratify the CRPD.209 In the field of civil law,
the partial restriction (restriction according to area of authority) of
active legal capacity has been possible since 2001.210 Even so,
Hungarian law has yet to comply fully with the provisions of the United
Nations Convention—provisions, which are based on the common law
system approach to legal capacity. In Hungary, the right of a person to
active legal capacity is still subject to limitations. In this respect, the
adoption of a new Hungarian Civil Code would result in a significant
201. Lang, supra note 12, at 268–69; Priestley, supra note 109, at 62–63.
202. PLATE, supra note 129, at 365–66.
203. See, e.g., Varul et al., supra note 5, at 104; Knauer, supra note 135, at 335.
204. See INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW, supra note 142, at 269.
205. See, e.g., Joaquin Zuckerberg, International Human Rights for Mentally Ill Persons:
The Ontario Experience, 30 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 512, 521 (2007); Varul et al., supra note 5,
at 103.
206. See Hungary: Parliament Reforms Legal Capacity Laws, supra note 17.
207. See id.
208. See id.
209. MDAC REPORT, supra note 94, at 2.
210. See Körös, supra note 163, at 6.
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change. Combining the common law and civil law models will abolish
guardianship excluding active legal capacity and it will also introduce
several legal institutions that ensure the effective implementation of the
rights of persons with psychosocial disabilities while placing no
restrictions on active legal capacity. The adoption of the new Hungarian
Civil Code will ensure that Hungarian law complies with the provisions
of the United Nations Convention, thereby establishing a legal
framework that attends to the specific circumstances, interests, and
needs of people with disabilities.

